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Ancillary To An Otherwise Enforceable Agreement

Finally, the employer argued that its agreement to grant a 90-day dismissal without cause was sufficient to enforce the non-competition regime. However, the Tribunal found that the 90-day termination did not justify the need for a non-competition obligation, so that the termination provision did not meet the obligation to propose the non-compete obligation to an existing and otherwise applicable agreement. [Strickland v. Medtronic (Dallas Court of Appeals, 2003).] An agreement not to face competition is a contract like any other – it must be supported by a reflection to be legally applicable. In other words, both parties to the agreement must exchange promises in order for the agreement to be applicable. In exchange for the worker`s willingness not to compete with the employer, the employer must provide something to the employee. For the rest, the promise not to run is illusory. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that “otherwise enforceable section 15.50 (a) agreements can do without employment at will as long as the consideration of a promise is not illusory.” Alex Sheshunoff Management Services, L.P. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex. 2006) (citing Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1994)).

In other words, a non-competition clause must be supported by counterparties or reciprocal promises in order to be enforceable in the framework of the work of the will. But what does that really mean? In Sheshunoff, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the issue by finding that the non-compete contract of a non-compete letter becomes applicable if the employer keeps the promises it made in exchange for Confederation. Sheshunoff, 2006 WL 2997287, at 1. The underlying counterparty exchange should therefore not be immediate; All it takes is a one-sided treaty. Id. at 1, 9. However, some courts have not taken such a restrictive approach. These courts held that the undertaking to provide confidential information in exchange for a commitment not to disclose such information was sufficient to support a non-compete contract as long as the employer subsequently provided such confidential information. See z.B.

Wright v. Sport Supply Group, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tex). App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.) ; Ireland v. Franklin, 950 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). Indeed, the case received increased attention in 2003, when the Fifth Circuit found that a customer incompading agreement, generally considered to be the subject of the same analysis as a non-competition agreement, could be supported by a unilateral contract: Fielding, 289 S.W.3d to 851. The Texas Supreme Court held that the non-competition agreement was applicable because there was a tacit contract: “If the type of work the employee has assigned to perform requires that confidential information be provided for the work to be performed by the worker, the employer promises implied confidential information.” Fielding, 289 S.W.3d to 850 (addition). The court stated that if a party makes an explicit promise that cannot reasonably be made without any kind of benefit from the other party, the courts may involve a promise of return, so that the parties` cases can be interpreted to mean something instead of nothing at all.